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Abstract 
  The purpose of this paper is to provide a specific test of Boucher, Carter et al. 
(2008) framework on risk rationing. The data were collected through a survey of 730 
farm households in Shaanxi province conducted in November 2010. We compare 
factor associated with risk rationed, quantity rationed and price rationed farmers. 
Seemingly unrelated regressions are performed using risk rationing, quantity rationing 
and price rationing measure as the dependent variable and measures of demography, 
wealth, income, year of farming and risk aversion as independent variables. We apply 
seemingly unrelated regression, cluster analysis and cross tabulation in the study. 
According to a seemingly unrelated regression, we find existing risk rationing is due 
to risk-based behavior by borrowers. A cross tabulation results support the proposition 
by Boucher, Carter et al showing the financial wealthy is risk rationed and relatively 
land-poor is risk rationed. This paper is believed to be among the first empirical 
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1.  Introduction 
Previous literature has shown the existence of risk rationing and its 
significance as the borrower voluntarily withdraws from the credit market even she 
has the collateral wealth needed to qualify for a loan contract. Recent literature by  
Boucher, Carter et al. (2008) presents theory of risk rationing and identify the 
necessary and sufficient condition of risk rationing incidence. The goal of this paper is 
to provide a specific test of Boucher, Carter et al. (2008) framework on risk rationing. 
This paper uses a unique survey form to collect land use rights and risk rationing data. 
Survey questions were designed so that risk rationing could easily be extracted.  
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we briefly 
review the model structure on risk rationing. In Section 3, several hypotheses are 
derived. Next, we describe credit rationing status and the household survey data that 
are used in the analysis. The seemingly unrelated regression, cluster analysis and cross 
tabulation are formulated in the following section. The empirical results are presented 
and discussed. 
 
2.  Model 
The model structure is based on Boucher, Carter et al. (2008). A farmer 
chooses activity choice between a safe, subsistence reservation activity and a risky 
commercial activity where the latter must be financed by an optimally designed credit 
contract offered by a competitive sector of lenders.  4 
 
Agent’s endowments are consist of financial wealth, , and land,  . Financial 
wealth is liquid and can be used as collateral to secure production loans. Land can also 
be used as collateral and sold at price   . 
Agents allocate their land between two activities; reservation or subsistence 
activity which is safe and commercial activity which is risky but gives higher return. 
A reservation activity does not require capital and yields a certain return   per unit 
land. A risky commercial activity requires a fixed investment   per unit land and 
yields an uncertain return with gross revenues    per unit land if good state is realized 
and gross revenues    per unit land if bad state is realized. 
Assume an agent has additively separable utility function  
     ,                                       (1) 
where     is consumable wealth in state j and e is the effort exerted in production which 
can be either high (e = H) or low (e = L). The disutility of effort,     , is increasing in 
effort so that            . Let    be the probability of the state of nature under 
effort e, so that        . 
Assume        so that an agent must borrow to utilize the commercial 
activity. 
The optimal contract maximizes the agent’s expected utility subject to the 
principal’s (lender’s) participation constraint and the agent’s incentive compatibility 
constraint (ICC). We solve for optimal loan contract    ,    where    and    are the 
borrower’s payoff per unit area financed under the good and bad states of nature. 
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Quantity rationing occurs when  
(a) the agent would be offered and demand a credit contract in the symmetric 
information world; but,  
(b) the agent lacks sufficient wealth to collateralize the contract (i.e.,         
    
   ,  ). 
 Risk rationing occurs when 
(a) the agent would be offered and demand a credit contract in the symmetric 
information world;  
(b) the agent is offered a financially feasible contract in the asymmetric 
information world (i.e.,               
   ,  ) but, 
(c) the agent chooses not to accept the offered contract, preferring the reservation 
subsistence activity. 











3.   Hypotheses and Regressors 
  Based on the theory and implication reported by Boucher, Carter et al. (2008), 
a number of hypotheses that describe the most important factors explaining credit 
rationing were formulated.  
1) Wealth-biased quantity rationing 
  Quantity rationing is decreasing in financial wealth and productive wealth. 
2) Risk rationing and financial wealth 
  2.1) The financial wealthy is risk rationed. Thiele and Wambach (1999) and 
Boucher, Carter et al. (2008) demonstrate that the occurrence of risk rationing may 
depend on the type of wealth considered. 
Let A and P denote the coefficient of absolute risk aversion and predence 
respectively.  
2.2) If P > 3A, then an agent with financial wealthy (rich) will prefer 
commercial activity and poor will prefer subsistence activity and be risk rationed.  
2.3) If P < 3A, poor will prefer commercial activity and rich will prefer 
subsistence activity and be risk rationed.  
3) Risk rationing and productive wealth 
The relatively land-poor is risk rationed. The land-wealthy choose to 
participate in the credit market and fully exploit their productive asset (land).  
 
The seemingly unrelated regression and two-step cluster analysis are employed 
to test the above hypotheses. The dependent variables, risk rationing, quantity 
rationing and price rationing are identified based on credit rationing status. 7 
 
The independent variables in a model consist of sex, education, year of 
farming, farm size, household income, asset value, farm profit and Binswanger risk 
aversion measure which can be drawn from the survey data. We also conduct a simple 
field experiment to estimate the partial risk aversion coefficient of the farmers based 
on Binswanger (1981). The Binswanger risk aversion measure is obtained from the 
question “"Imagine an honest stranger comes up to you and offers a gamble with the 
payout depending on the flip of a coin. If the coin lands heads you get the amount in 
the first column of Table 1 and if it lands tails you get the amount in the second 
column. Each has a 50% chance of occurring. If the gamble was repeated by many 
flips of the coin you would expect to receive the amount in the third column. While 
the odds of receiving the amount in the first column are the same as the odds in the 
second column the high and low values are different. Study the six gambles in the 
table and select the one gamble that you would prefer". 
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Table 1: Measurement of Risk Aversion Coefficient (Binswanger, 1981) 
 













of partial risk 
aversion at 
all levels 
1  500  500  500  Extreme  7.5 
2  950  450  700  Severe  3.615 
3  1200  400  800  Intermediate  1.189 
4  1500  300  900  Moderate  0.506 
5  1900  100  1000  Slight to 
neutral 
0.168 
6  2000  0  1000  Neutral to 
preferred 
  0 
 
 
4.  Credit Rationing Status 
The survey asked questions that made it possible to infer respondents’ credit 
rationing status based on Boucher, Guirkinger et al. (2006). Price rationed farmer is 
the one who borrowed and were happy with the amount they received. An applicant 
who was rejected a loan is quantity rationed. A non-applicant is the most difficult to 
classify. He might not have applied because of three reasons; first, he knew that he 
would be rejected (quantity rationed); second, he was afraid to lose collateral (risk 
rationed); or third, he had enough money and no need to borrow (price rationed). 
Three types of credit rationed farmers namely risk rationed, quantity rationed and 
price rationed farmers have been identified and used as dependent variables. 
   9 
 
5.  Survey and Data 
The farm household survey was conducted in Shaanxi province, Yangling 
district in November 2010. Seven hundred thirty households were surveyed. Each 
household was interviewed by either one or two graduate students from Northwest 
Agriculture and Forestry University. The students recorded interviewee responses on a 
paper survey form which was later entered into a database. The survey itself dealt 
exclusively with farm finance, risk perception and management, and transaction of 
land use rights. 
The characteristics of these communities are as follows. On average there are 
about five people living in each household. The average number of years farming is 28 
years, and the average farm size is 5mu (about 5/6th of an acre). Household income 
average is $23,796 RMB/year with approximately 41 percent of household income 
coming from farm activities. The average profit per year earned from cropped land is 
953 RMB/mu. The average asset per household is 218,208 RMB while the average 
debt per household is 20,531 RMB.  
In order to identify who is risk rationed farmer from the survey response, we 
separate Chinese farmers into two groups. The first is a group of 52 farmers who did 
not request a loan but a local RCC or bank evaluates their creditworthiness and offers 
them a loan. The proportion of risk rationed farmers in the first group is 23.1 percent 
who indicated that they did not use the total amount of credit made available to them 
because they are afraid of losing collateral. The second group is farmers who must 
formally request a loan from their local RCC or bank. There are 121 farmers who have 
applied for a loan within the past two years but 568 farmers have not. Among 121 10 
 
farmers who have applied for a loan, no risk rationed farmer is found in this group. 
Among 568 farmers who have not applied for a loan, approximately 7.6 percent of 
these farmers are risk rationed. They responded that they have not applied from RCC 
or bank in the last two years because they are afraid of losing collateral. Among all 
730 respondents, the total proportion of risk rationed farmers is approximately 6 
percent. When we generalize this percentage to 350 million farm households in China, 
there are 21 million farm households who are risk rationed. 
To compare characteristics among credit rationed farmers, quantity rationed 
and price rationed farmers were also identified. Approximately 2.2 percent of all 
respondents are quantity rationed who indicated that they must formally request a loan 
from RCC or bank and have applied for a loan within the past two years but RCC or 
bank did not offer them any loan. The proportion of price rationed farmers is 
approximately 17.4 percent who indicated either they actually used a loan that RCC or 
bank offered to them without requesting a loan or they have applied for a loan and 
accepted the offered loan. 
 
6.  Seemingly Unrelated Regression Results 
In this section the results of the hypotheses testing are reported. To investigate 
the determinants of the credit rationing farmers, seemingly unrelated regression analysis is 
performed explaining the type of wealth associated with risk rationing, quantity rationing and 
price rationing. Corresponding to the formulated hypotheses above, 8 independent variables 
are included in the regression. The results are presented in Table 2. 
1)  Wealth-biased quantity rationing 11 
 
In order to test wealth-biased quantity rationing hypothesis, a financial wealth 
is represented by household income and asset value; a productive wealth is 
represented by land size. We find quantity rationing is decreasing in financial wealth 
but not in productive wealth. However, all variables representing financial wealth and 
productive wealth are not statistically significant. An increasing in financial wealth 
tends to relax quantity rationing, but an increasing in land endowment will not relax 
quantity rationing. 
2)  Risk rationing and financial wealth:  
The financial wealthy is risk rationed. Household income variable on risk 
rationing is positive but not statistically significant.  
3) Risk rationing and productive wealth 
Land size variable on risk rationing is not statistically significant but the sign is 
correct and negative. A result shows that the relatively land-poor is risk rationed. 
  In addition, we find Binswanger risk aversion coefficient is significantly 
associated with risk rationing. However, the sign of Binswanger is negative meaning 
that the more risk averse farmers are, the lower the probability of being risk rationed. 
This result is counter-intuitive. However, this confirms that risk rationed farmers are 
risk averse and the existing risk rationing is mainly due to risk-based behavior by 
borrowers. 
  Moreover, a farm profit is associated with price rationing and statistically 
significant at 1 percent level. Farmers with higher profit are more likely to be price 
rationed.   
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7.  Cluster Analysis 
The goal of this cluster analysis is to form similar groups of farmers and test 
hypothesis 2.2) if P > 3A, then an agent with financial wealthy (rich) will prefer 
commercial activity and poor will prefer subsistence activity and be risk rationed; and 
hypothesis 2.3) if P < 3A, poor will prefer commercial activity and rich will prefer 
subsistence activity and be risk rationed. Let RRA denote the coefficient of relative 
risk aversion, we apply RRA < ½ to represent P > 3A and RRA > ½ to represent P < 
3A (see Boucher, Carter et al. 2008, page 417). 
We apply the two-step cluster procedure. The categorical variables are 1) 
coefficient of relative risk aversion greater than ½; 2) whether farmer is risk rationed 
and 3) whether farmer is rich or poor. According to the data, the average asset value of 
Shaanxi farmers is 218,208.47 RMB. A farmer who has an asset value greater than 
218,208.47 RMB is considered rich, otherwise is poor.  A model summary and results 
of the two-step cluster analysis are shown in Figure 1-6. 
Cluster 1 is not consistent with hypothesis 2.3. We find 23.4 percent of farmers 
are rich and have RRA > ½ (P < 3A), but they are not risk rationed. Similarly, cluster 
2 is not consistent with hypothesis 2.2. Approximately 12.1 percent of farmers have 
RRA < ½ (P > 3A). The majority of farmers in this cluster are poor. All farmers in 
cluster 2 are not risk rationed. Also, cluster 3 with the size of 5.7 percent is not 
consistent with hypothesis 2.3. The majority of farmers are poor and have RRA > ½ (P 
< 3A). All of them are risk rationed. However, only cluster 4 is consistent with 
hypothesis 2.3. We find 58.8 percent of farmers are poor and have RRA > ½ (P < 3A), 13 
 
and they are not risk rationed. Therefore, the proposition proposed by Boucher, Carter 
et al. is consistent with 58.8 percent in one cluster that are non-risk rationed. 
 
8.  Cross Tabulation Analysis 
With the regression and cluster analysis, we do not find any significant 
variables on the hypotheses. We try to apply a cross tabulation analysis to examine the 
partial effect of risk rationing. 
1)  Wealth-biased quantity rationing 
Table 3 shows the ambiguity of relationship between quantity rationing and 
asset value as well as a relationship between quantity rationing and farm size. 
Therefore, we are not able to conclude that quantity rationing is decreasing in financial 
wealth and productive wealth by using cross tabulation analysis. 
2) Risk rationing and financial wealth 
  Results from Table 4 support that the financial wealthy is risk rationed. We 
cross tabulate asset value with risk rationed farmers. The proportion of risk rationed 
farmers is increasing in asset value. As asset value increases, the proportion of risk 
rationed farmers is greater than the proportion of non-risk rationed farmers. 
3) Risk rationing and productive wealth 
We find that relatively land-poor is risk rationed. A cross tabulation results in 





9.  Conclusion  
The purpose of this paper is to provide a specific test of risk rationing theory 
proposed by Boucher, Carter et al. (2008). The farm household survey was conducted 
in Shaanxi province in November 2010 and 730 households were surveyed. Survey 
questions were designed so that credit rationing could easily be extracted. This paper 
has an important empirical contribution, since it is among the first analyzing the rural sample 
that consists of households who are risk rationed, quantity rationed and price rationed. We 
apply seemingly unrelated regression, cluster analysis and cross tabulation in the 
study. 
Among all 730 respondents, the total proportion of risk rationed farmers is 
approximately 6 percent. When we generalize this percentage to 350 million farm 
households in China, there are 21 million farm households who are risk rationed. The 
main result of the paper is that the cross tabulation analysis supports the hypothesis that 
financial wealthy is risk rationed and relatively land-poor is risk rationed. However, 
results based on the seemingly unrelated regression and cluster analysis are not 
significant and consistent with propositions by Boucher, Carter et al. The incidence of 
risk rationing is important to policy implication. Land use rights in China will be only 
partially effective as it does not increase farmers’ willingness to offer up the collateral 
needed to obtain loans. 
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Table 2: Seemingly Unrelated Regression Results 
           
Risk Rationed  Quantity Rationed  Price Rationed 
           (1)           (2)          (3) 
Sex  0.0088432  0.0065058  0.023043 
(0.0198357)  (0.0125393)  (0.0304527) 
Education  0.0048159  0.0083313**  0.0096751 
(0.0058787)  (0.0037162)  (0.0090252) 
Years of Farming  -0.00036  0.0007149  7.17E-05 
(0.0008195)  (0.0005181)  (0.0012582) 
Farm Size  -2.12E-03  1.07E-04  -3.82E-03 
(0.0038225)  (0.0024164)  (0.0058685) 
Household Income  4.11E-07  -2.88E-07  -8.85E-08 
(0.000000468)  (0.000000296)  (0.000000718) 
Asset Value  -3.79E-08  -2.11E-08  8.43E-08 
(0.0000000465)  (0.0000000294)  (0.0000000714) 
Farm Profit  2.46E-06  -2.19E-06  0.0000542*** 
(0.00000476)  (0.00000301)  (0.0000073) 
Binswanger  -0.0052731*  -1.38E-03  -1.61E-03 
(0.0028338)  (0.0017914)  (0.0043506) 
Observations  648  648  648 
Note: Each observation is a household. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
The dependent variable for each column is listed in the column heading. 
***Significant at the 1 percent level, ** 5 percent level, *10 percent level 
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Table 3: Cross Tabulation Analysis: Wealth-biased quantity rationing 
Asset Value (RMB) (Binned) * Quantity Rationed Farmer Cross tabulation 
% within Quantity Rationed Farmer 
 
Quantity Rationed Farmer 
Total  0  1 
Asset Value (RMB) (Binned)  <= 50000  11.6%    11.4% 
50001 - 92500  8.7%  6.7%  8.6% 
92501 - 100000  13.0%  26.7%  13.3% 
100001 - 130000  8.5%  6.7%  8.5% 
130001 - 150000  11.6%  26.7%  12.0% 
150001 - 200000  17.6%  6.7%  17.4% 
200001 - 300000  12.8%  20.0%  13.0% 
300001 - 500000  8.7%  6.7%  8.6% 
500001+  7.5%    7.3% 
Total  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 
 
Farm size excluding rented (Binned) * Quantity Rationed Farmer Cross tabulation 
% within Quantity Rationed Farmer 
 
Quantity Rationed Farmer 
Total  0  1 
Farm size excluding rented 
(Binned) 
<= 2.00  11.7%  12.5%  11.7% 
2.01 - 3.00  12.1%  18.8%  12.2% 
3.01 - 4.00  17.1%  6.3%  16.9% 
4.01 - 5.00  20.2%  18.8%  20.2% 
5.01 - 6.00  16.2%  12.5%  16.1% 
6.01 - 6.60  3.2%  12.5%  3.4% 
6.61 - 7.50  11.1%    10.9% 
7.51+  8.4%  18.8%  8.7% 
Total  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
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Table 4: Cross Tabulation Analysis: Risk rationing and financial wealth 
 
Asset Value (RMB) (Binned) * Risk Rationed Farmer Cross tabulation 
% within Risk Rationed Farmer 
 
Risk Rationed Farmer 
Total  0  1 
Asset Value (RMB) (Binned)  <= 50000  11.6%  7.5%  11.4% 
50001 - 92500  8.7%  7.5%  8.6% 
92501 - 100000  13.5%  10.0%  13.3% 
100001 - 130000  8.7%  5.0%  8.5% 
130001 - 150000  12.1%  10.0%  12.0% 
150001 - 200000  16.7%  27.5%  17.4% 
200001 - 300000  12.4%  22.5%  13.0% 
300001 - 500000  8.5%  10.0%  8.6% 
500001+  7.8%    7.3% 
Total  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 
 
Table 5: Cross Tabulation Analysis: Risk rationing and productive wealth 
 
Farm size excluding rented (Binned) * Risk Rationed Farmer Cross tabulation 
% within Risk Rationed Farmer 
 
Risk Rationed Farmer 
Total  0  1 
Farm size excluding rented 
(Binned) 
<= 2.00  11.5%  14.0%  11.7% 
2.01 - 3.00  12.3%  11.6%  12.2% 
3.01 - 4.00  16.6%  20.9%  16.9% 
4.01 - 5.00  20.6%  14.0%  20.2% 
5.01 - 6.00  15.9%  18.6%  16.1% 
6.01 - 6.60  3.4%  4.7%  3.4% 
6.61 - 7.50  10.8%  11.6%  10.9% 
7.51+  8.9%  4.7%  8.7% 
Total  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
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Figure 1: Two-Step Cluster Analysis Model Summary 
 
Figure 2: Cluster Solutions 
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